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Abstract:	   A	   key	   prediction	   of	   transaction	   cost	   economics	   is	   that	   the	   presence	   of	  
relationship-­‐specific	   assets	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   of	   vertical	   integration	   whenever	  
contracts	  are	  incomplete.	  I	  explore	  a	  firm	  level	  data	  set	  on	  Eastern	  European	  and	  Central	  
Asian	  firms,	  the	  BEEPS	  2005	  Survey	  provided	  by	  the	  EBRD	  and	  World	  Bank,	  to	  test	  this	  
prediction.	   I	   measure	   lock-­‐in	   by	   supplier	   substitution,	   and	   vertical	   integration	   by	   the	  
presence	  of	  sales	  to	  the	  parent	  firm,	  and	  find	  the	  TCE	  prediction	  confirmed	  in	  the	  data:	  
At	  the	  extensive	  margin,	  a	  firm	  whose	  customers	  are	  locked-­‐in	  at	  medium	  or	  high	  levels	  
is	   about	   5	   to	   6	   percent	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   vertically	   integrated	   than	   a	   firm	   whose	  
customers	  are	  not	  locked-­‐in.	  At	  the	  intensive	  margin,	  I	  find	  that	  high	  lock-­‐in	  raises	  intra-­‐
group	   sales	   by	   about	   2	   percentage	   points.	   Being	   a	   large	   firm	   raises	   the	   probability	   of	  
being	  vertically	  integrated	  significantly	  in	  itself,	  but	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  impact	  of	  lock-­‐in	  
on	   the	   probability	   of	   carrying	   out	   intra-­‐group	   sales.	   Instead,	   operating	   in	   a	   non-­‐
manufacturing	   industry	  significantly	   reduces	  the	  probability	  of	  vertical	   integration,	  and	  
also	  reduces	  the	  impact	  of	  high	  lock-­‐in	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  positive	  sales	  with	  a	  
parent.	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1 Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, the economies of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) have undergone a radical transition from centrally planned
to market economies, which allowed living standards to rise to unprece-
dented levels, and in some cases to almost catch up with Western European
standards. At the heart of this transition was the restructuring of the pro-
ductive system, be it through privatization of formerly state-owned firms,
through foreign direct investment (FDI), or through home-grown business
initiatives.
While the optimal sequencing of privatizations was at the center of at-
tention in the early years of the transition period1, the focus of research has
since shifted towards studying the impact of FDI on CEE and EU economies,
and the gradual integration of CEE countries into the world economy, in
particular into the European Union.
The massive inflow of FDI in CEE countries has affected both host and
home countries in a number of ways, and not always to their benefit. For in-
stance, foreign investors have been accused of driving small local suppliers
out of the market; this concern has been dismissed by a number of authors,
at least for the agricultural sector; rather than hurting the local suppliers, the
latter benefited from vertical and horizontal spillover effects of FDI, which
led to improved access to finance, increased investments, product quality
improvements, and growth of small local suppliers (see Gow and Swinnen
1998, Dries and Swinnen 2004, Dries et al. 2009).
However, Pavlı´nek (2004) gives a much less optimistic account of the im-
pact of FDI on the local Czech automotive components industry: He iden-
tifies potentially adverse effects on the regional economy, such as the in-
tensification of uneven development, the development of a dual economy,
the failure to develop linkages with local and regional economies, and its
contribution to increased regional economic instability. In a similar spirit,
Fons-Rosen et al. (2013) find that the positive impact of FDI on aggregate
growth seems to be much lower than generally assumed.
Regarding the impact of FDI on CEE’s export performance, Hoekman
and Djankow (1996) acknowledge that FDI inflows, which really took off
in 1994, correlate highly with levels of intra-industry trade between CEE
and EU economies; but if large investments in the automobile sector are ex-
cluded, foreign direct investment seems unlikely to have been a major force
driving the growth of intra-industry trade. The authors argue that these
exchanges and the underlying integration into the world economy mostly
reflect arm’s-length transactions between CEE firms and their Western Eu-
ropean counterparts.
1 See for instance Tirole (1991), Blanchard (1993), and Carlin et al. (1992) in the economics
literature; Uhlenbruck and De Castro (2000), Brouthers et al. (2001), and Uhlenbruck et
al. (2003), in the management literature.
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Another key issue regarding FDI is their impact on the labor market both
in the host country and in the country of origin. As far as the host country is
concerned, Jude and Silaghi (2015) study a panel of 20 Central and Eastern
European Countries during the period 1995–2012, and find that FDI initially
has a negative effect on employment, while the progressive vertical integra-
tion of foreign affiliates into the local economy eventually converges toward
a positive long run effect, at least for EU countries.
Whether FDI also displaces jobs in the home countries of foreign in-
vestors has long been a contentious issue: Braconier and Ekholm (2001)
study firm-level data on Swedish multinationals to analyze how the recent
expansion of affiliate employment in CEE has affected affiliate employment
elsewhere. They find that employment in affiliates located in other low-
wage countries in Europe decreased substantially as a consequence of the
expansion in CEE, while the effects on employment in Sweden and other
high-wage European countries, although present, are much smaller (see
also Cuyvers et al. 2005).
The increased openness of CEE economies and their integration into the
European Union has also raised a number of concerns in Western European
countries. To begin with, the poorer EU countries such as Spain, Portugal
and Ireland, were afraid that investors would divert FDI away from them
and towards CEE countries. However, these concerns seem to have been
unfounded, see Brenton et al. (1999). As far as the agricultural sector is con-
cerned, Swinnen (2002) argues that trade concessions and market openings
which provide farmers in CEE countries easier access to the common market
causes major concerns for EU-15 farmers already facing a relatively declin-
ing sector and increased competition for EU subsidies under the Common
Agricultural Policy.
While our understanding of the consequences of restructuring in CEE,
and of FDI in particular, has dramatically improved over the last 20 years,
we still know very little about why some firms decided to vertically inte-
grate in the first place, while others specialized in one stage of production
and maintained arm’s-length relationships with other firms.
Economic theory offers two competing views on this question: Neoclas-
sical theory views vertical integration as an attempt to earn monopoly rents
by leveraging market power from monopolized input markets into compet-
itive distribution channels, or vice versa.2 The transaction cost approach,
by contrast, emphasizes that vertical coordination can be an efficient means
of protecting relationship-specific investments or mitigating other potential
conflicts under incomplete contracting.3 The starting point for the TCE ap-
2 This view is still prominent in much of the antitrust literature; recently, the issue of par-
tial vertical integration has received renewed attention, see Flath (1989), Greenlee and
Raskovich (2006), Serbera (2011), Jovanovic and Wey (2013), Gonc¸alves (2013), Choi et al.
(2014), Levy et al. (2015).
3 See Oliver Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1996) influential work based on Coase’s (1937) anal-
ysis of the boundaries of the firm
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proach is the following: When contracts are incomplete, and parties develop
relationship-specific assets, they face the hazard of ex post opportunistic
behavior; each party may attempt to ”hold up” the other to appropriate
a larger share of the relationship-specific gains from trade, the so-called
”quasi-rents”. A central prediction of this theory is that higher levels of
lock-in should make it more likely that the two parties integrate.
As transaction cost economics was developed in the 1970s and 1980s,
a stream of empirical literature emerged explaining the “make-or-buy de-
cision” using transaction cost reasoning (see next Section for a survey of
this literature). However, all these papers rely on data of highly devel-
oped countries, typically the US. We know next to nothing about the driv-
ing forces of vertical integration in transition economies. This paper is an
attempt to close this gap and to understand whether the major insights of
TCE also carry over to emerging economies such as the CEE countries.
To do this, I will use a firm-level dataset called Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) which, in its 2005 round, cov-
ers almost 10,000 establishments in 27 Eastern European and Central Asian
countries. The dataset was collected by the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the World Bank. The declared goal of this sur-
vey was to “advise governments on ways to change policies and practices
that impose a burden on private firms and to develop new projects and
programs that strengthen support for enterprise growth” (see introductory
statement of the questionnaire 2005).
A unique feature of the BEEPS dataset is that it contains information
on the recipients of respondent establishment’s sales, by asking specifically
which share of sales is going to the government, to state-owned enterprises,
to multinationals, to large domestic firms, small firms and individuals, and
most importantly: to the establishment’s own parent company or affiliated
subsidiaries. This information, which is of great interest to researchers in-
vestigating vertical relations, is not typically available in any of the standard
firm level datasets used in the literature; it gives us a unique insight into the
strength of the vertical ties between an establishment and its parent.
I will define all those establishment that report such sales to their parent
or affiliates as vertically integrated, while those firms which are indepen-
dently owned and report sales to other large firms (domestic and foreign),
but not to any parent, will be classified as vertically separated. This leaves
us with a pure cross-section sample of about 3,300 firms, of which about
20 percent are vertically integrated with their customer, while the remain-
ing 80 percent are vertically separated. Vertical integration will be used as
dependent variable in our analysis.
The main explanatory variable will be the level of supplier substitution,
which I construct from a question in the survey asking firm managers about
the likely reaction of their customers following a hypothetical price increase
of 10% for their main product line. I will consider the firm’s customer as
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highly locked in if such a price increase would have no impact on the quan-
tities purchased, as mildly locked-in if the customer would reduce the quan-
tities bought from its supplier (but nonetheless continue to buy from the
same supplier), and as not locked-in if the customer would switch to an-
other supplier.
Then, I test the key prediction of TCE theory, namely that more lock-in
should make vertical integration more likely. The data clearly support this
prediction, even after controlling for establishment size, age, industry and
country characteristics: At the extensive margin, a firm whose customers
are locked-in at medium or high levels is about 5 to 6 percent more likely
to be vertically integrated than a firm whose customers are not locked-in.
At the intensive margin, I find that high lock-in raises intra-group sales by
about 2 percentage points.
This result applies to young and old firms alike. Being an exporter signif-
icantly reduces the impact of lock-in for very high levels of the latter. Being a
large firm raises the probability of being vertically integrated significantly in
itself, but does not alter the impact of lock-in on the probability of carrying
out intra-group sales. Instead, operating in a non-manufacturing industry
significantly reduces the probability of vertical integration, and also reduces
the impact of high lock-in on the probability of having positive sales with a
parent.
2 Literature Review
Most of the empirical work on the decision to vertically integrate4 tries
to test the transaction cost theory in a simple econometric framework in
which the probability of observing a particular organizational form or gov-
ernance structure (in-house production vs. outsourcing) is a function of cer-
tain properties of the underlying transaction, most notably asset specificity
as defined by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996). Organizational form is the de-
pendent variable, while asset specificity is the main independent variable;
to a minor extent, some studies have also included measures for uncertainty
of demand or complexity and frequency of transactions into the framework
to account for the level of contractual frictions that the parties are likely to
encounter.
The key hypothesis is that we are more likely to observe a more in-
tegrated governance structure if the amount or value of the relationship-
specific assets involved is relatively high. Organizational form is typically
modeled as a discrete variable: “make or buy”, for example, but there are
also cases in which it is represented by a continuous variable.
To operationalize the explanatory variable, asset specificity is often prox-
ied by technical specifications like product complexity, qualitatively coded
4 See Joskow (2005) and Klein (2005) for excellent surveys on the empirical TCE literature.
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from survey data or quantitatively assigned by inspection (Masten, 1984;
Bigelow, 2001); worker-specific knowledge, again coded from survey data,
as a proxy for human asset specificity (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Mas-
ters and Miles, 2002); physical proximity of contracting firms, as a proxy for
site specificity (Joskow, 1985; Spiller, 1985; Gonza´lez-Diaz, et al. 2000); and
spatial and temporal proximity (Masten et al. 1991; Pirrong, 1993; Hubbard,
1999).
Where asset specificity cannot be easily measured, concentration has
been used in single-industry studies to capture situations where small num-
bers bargaining situations are likely to appear (Ohanian, 1994).5 Uncer-
tainty is typically measured through sales variance (Levy, 1985; Anderson
and Schmittlein, 1984) and some measure of technological uncertainty, such
as the frequency of changes in product specification and the probability
of technological change (Walker and Weber, 1984; Crocker and Reynolds,
1993).
The typical empirical approach we find in this literature is that of a case
study (either qualitative or quantitative) which analyzes the make-or-buy
decision in a single firm or industry; we rarely find cross-sectional or panel
data from multiple firms or industries.6 Canonical examples of the case-
study strand of literature are Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984),
and Joskow (1985). Monteverde and Teece (1982) study the make or buy de-
cision (i.e. internal versus external procurement) in the automobile indus-
try, more specifically for 133 components used by GM and Ford in 1976. The
authors argue that not all of these components require the same level of en-
gineering specific knowledge. Rather, components involving more specific
knowledge also generate more hold-up risk, and are therefore more likely
to be made in-house, while components requiring less specific knowledge
can be procured externally.
Along similar lines, Masten (1984) investigates procurement decisions
of a large aerospace company over 1,887 components. The key assumption
is that the degree of component complexity also measures the difficulty of
complete contracting. This variable and the degree to which the component
was specialized to this aerospace firm were found to significantly affect the
likelihood of vertical integration.
Joskow’s (1985) paper studies the relationship between coal suppliers
and electric plants that burn coal in the US for 1979. Some electric plants
are ”mine-mouth”, meaning that they are located close to the coal mine that
supplies them. Other plants are designed to burn a specific type of coal
(but not necessarily from a specific supplier). Among other things, Joskow
5 In this paper I will also use the number of a firm’s competitor as an alternative measure
for supplier substitutability, to complement the results we obtain from our main measure,
namely lock-in.
6 My paper clearly belongs to the second category, and is the first to explore TCE in a
transition economy environment.
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finds that mine-mouth plants are more likely to be integrated with the cor-
responding coal mine.
The common theme in these paper is that asset specificity is associated
with tighter vertical coordination, a result that has since been confirmed
for a large number of industries, including electricity generation (Saussier,
2000), aluminum (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart, 1988), forestry (Globerman and
Schwindt, 1986), cable TV (Williamson, 1976), chemicals (Lieberman, 1991),
engineering (Lyons, 1995), trucking (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003, Baker
and Hubbard, 2003, 2004), offshore oil gathering (Hallwood, 1991), informa-
tion technology (Ulset, 1996), electronic components (Weiss and Kurland,
1997), construction (Gonza´lez-Diaz et al. 2000), and even stock exchanges
(Bindseil, 1997).
Let us now turn to those studies that have used cross-sectional or panel
data to estimate TCE theory: Levy (1985) uses the ratio of value-added to
sales as a cross-industry measure of vertical integration (where this ratio
should approach 1 the more integrated production is in a particular indus-
try, while it is closer to zero in industries with very fragmented vertical
chains); the number of firms and amount of R&D spending as measures of
asset specificity; and the variance of sales as a measure of uncertainty. Using
data from 69 firms representing 37 industries, he finds each of the indepen-
dent variables to have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of
vertical integration. Macmillan et al. (1986) obtain very similar results with
a larger sample. Harrigan (1986), by contrast, finds sales variability to result
in a lower chance of vertical integration, although she does not include a
measure for asset specificity.
Caves and Bradburd (1988) construct a more complicated cross-industry
measure of integration based on an input–output matrix of distribution ship-
ments across several industries. They use this metric to compare asset speci-
ficity, small-numbers bargaining conditions, and risk as determinants of
vertical integration. They find asset specificity and small-numbers situa-
tions, but not risk, to be significant.
More recently, some authors tried to address problems of selection bias
and the effects of unobserved heterogeneity by using panel data. Gonza´lez-
Diaz et al. (2000) assemble a panel of Spanish construction firms over a six-
year period and study the use of independent subcontractors. They regress
the percentage of subcontracting on a distance-based measure of asset speci-
ficity, a measure of uncertainty, time and firm-fixed effects, and other con-
trol variables. They find that asset specificity, but not uncertainty, explains
most of the outsourcing decision, even when controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. Other studies using panel data, such as Ohanian’s (1994) in-
vestigation of vertical integration in the U.S. pulp and paper industry and
Lafontaine and Shaw’s (1999) study of franchise contracting, also support
transaction cost explanations even when fixed effects are included.
Forbes and Lederman (2009) study the incentives for major US airlines
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to vertically integrate with small regional airlines that operate low-density
short and medium-haul flights on the major airline’s behalf out of the same
airport. Owning a regional partner mitigates incentive problems that arise
when unforeseen schedule disruptions, such as bad weather conditions, re-
quire the major to make changes that involve its regional partner’s opera-
tions.
Finally, TCE has been used to study management strategies, in particu-
lar regarding the choice of the optimal mode of entry, and the level of equity
ownership to hold in a new market. Delios and Henisz (2000) maintain that
a foreign investor’s ability to deal with public and private expropriation
hazards in the host countries is not stable over time, but will grow with this
firm’s prior experience. They study a sample of 660 Japanese firms which
made a total of 2,827 investments in 18 emerging economies in Africa, Asia,
Europe, and Latin America, and they conclude that a firm’s prior experi-
ence enhances hazard-mitigating capabilities and thus reduces sensitivity
to public and private expropriation hazards, leading to increases in equity
ownership in foreign subsidiaries.
3 The Estimation Equation
In our regression analysis, we will analyze the role of supplier substi-
tution (or lack thereof) on the corporate structure of the establishments in
our sample. We will study vertical integration both at its extensive mar-
gin and at the intensive margin, i.e. we study whether or not a firm has
positive sales to its parent, and how intense this sales relationship is. We
will therefore use different econometric models to accommodate these two
dimensions of vertical integration.
Our baseline model for vertical integration at the extensive margin will
be the following non-linear probability model:
V I = Φ (β1LI1 + β2LI2 + β3LI3 +Xβx + ε) (1)
where V I is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is vertically inte-
grated (i.e. if it reports a positive level of sales to its parent); Φ (·) is the
link function (either the cumulative normal distribution, or the logit func-
tion); LI1, LI2, LI3 are dummy variables taking value 1 if the firm reports
low, medium, or high lock-in, respectively (the complementary variable be-
ing “no lock-in”, which is excluded from the regressions to avoid multi-
collinearity); and X is a vector of firm-specific controls: the firm’s age and
size, its exports (as share of total sales), its industry and country, and the
way it was established (privatized, originally private etc.); and ε is the usual
error term.
With a dichotomous dependent variable, OLS estimation has some seri-
ous limitations, which is why non-linear probability models are generally
preferred over OLS in this case: (i) They constrain the predicted values to
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fall between 0 and 1, so that we can interpret these predictions as probabil-
ities of observing vertical integration; (ii) They deliver reliable results even
if the sample size is not very large (no huge concern here); and (iii) with a
probit model, errors are easier to correct in case of heteroscedasticity.
We will also try to shed light on the role of lock-in for the intensity of
the vertical relationship. To this end, we will use our observations on the
share of intra-group sales in a firm’s total sales as dependent variable; this
variable runs from 0 to 100, but has a large number of zeros, and positive
mass on all multiples of 10 and on some “focal” levels such as 25 and 75; it
is therefore not clear whether to classify it as a censored continuous variable
or as a count variable.
Typically, if the data exhibit numerous zeros and have a long upper tail
(as is the case for our observations on intra-group sales), OLS will not be
able to reproduce these features in its predicted values; we will therefore
supplement our OLS analysis with two models frequently used in the anal-
ysis of count data, namely the Poisson model and the Ordered Probit. A
key requirement of a Poisson process is that the conditional mean (i.e., the
expected outcome if the predictors equal their mean values) should equal
the conditional variance (i.e., the variance of the expected outcome). Some-
times, the dependent variable is over-dispersed, so that the conditional vari-
ance exceeds the conditional mean. We run a test for the goodness of fit
of the Poisson model, which does not reject the hypothesis that the condi-
tional mean equals the conditional variance, so that our Poisson results do
not seem to be problematic.
The ordered Probit is typically used when the LHS variable is ordered,
but the intervals between the scores are arbitrary; this is of course not the
case for our dependent variable, which is cardinal. Still, I provide results
also for this model to complement the results from OLS and the Poisson
model.
4 The Data
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. The survey was first undertaken
in 1999 - 2000, when it was administered to approximately 4,000 enterprises
in 26 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (including Turkey) and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The aim of the survey was
to investigate how enterprise restructuring behavior and performance were
related to competitive pressure, the quality of the business environment,
and the relationship between enterprises and the state.7 The second round
of the BEEPS took place in 2002 and covered about 6,500 enterprises in 27
7 A detailed description of the questionnaire and the implementation of the 1999 survey
can be found in Hellman et al. (2000).
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countries (including Turkey but excluding Turkmenistan).
The present paper builds on the third round of the BEEPS, which is a
cross-section of 9,655 enterprises in 27 transition economies: 16 from CEE
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, FR Yugoslavia, FYROM, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and 11 from the CIS (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). Each country is represented by 200
- 300 establishments, with the exception of the following countries, where
larger samples were drawn: Poland (975 establishments), Hungary, Russia,
Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Romania (about 600 each).
According to the July 2005 survey report by Synovate, who implemented
the survey on behalf of EBRD and World Bank, the BEEPS 2005 sample was
designed to replicate the sample distribution of BEEPS 2002 to maintain
comparability between the two data sets. In the BEEPS 2002 survey, the sec-
toral composition of the sample in terms of manufacturing (including agro-
processing) versus services (including commerce) was determined by their
relative contribution to GDP. Firms that operate in sectors subject to govern-
ment price regulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, electric
power, rail transport, and water and waste water, were excluded from the
sample. Enterprises which began operations in 2002, 2003 and 2004 were
excluded from the sample as well. As the main survey was conducted from
10th March through 20th April 2005, this means that each establishment in
the sample has a business history of at least three years.
In addition, the sample was required to meet the following minimum
quotas:
• Size: At least 10% of the sample was to be in the small (2 - 49 employ-
ees) and 10% in the large (250 - 9,999) size categories. Firms with only
one employee or more than 10,000 employees were excluded.
• Ownership: At least 10% of the establishments were to have foreign
control and 10% state control (where control means more than 50%
shareholding)
• Exporters: At least 10% of the establishments were to be exporters
(exports accounting for 20% or more of total sales)
• Location: At least 10% of establishments were to be in the category
small city / countryside (population under 50,000 inhabitants)
The BEEPS sample also has a small panel dimension, because the BEEPS
2005 survey covers some 1,500 respondents who already participated in
BEEPS 2002 and had agreed, at that time, to participate in future rounds
of the BEEPS.
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Table 1: Q4a - Firm’s largest shareholder currently
Frequency Percent Cumulative
1 Individual 6,102 63.65 63.65
2 Family 877 9.15 72.80
3 General public 86 0.90 73.69
4 Domestic company 492 5.13 78.83
5 Foreign company 531 5.54 84.36
6 Bank 7 0.07 84.44
7 Investment fund 40 0.42 84.85
8 Managers of the firm 221 2.31 87.16
9 Employees of the firm 223 2.33 89.49
10 Gov’t or gov’t agency 852 8.89 98.37
11 Other 156 1.63 100.00
Total 9,587 100.00
The survey was conducted by means of face-to-face interviews with top
level firm managers or owners in site visits, and encompasses questions on
the business environment (such as business regulation and taxation, law
and order and the judiciary, and on infrastructure and financial services,
administrative corruption, and state capture), and on firm performance, in
particular on the growth of firms, including the decisions to invest and to
innovate, and the growth of revenues and productivity.
The novelty of the data set in the empirical TCE literature calls for a
careful descriptive analysis. Let us start with a careful description of the
dependent and the key explanatory variable in our econometric exercise.
4.1 The dependent variable
The BEEPS 2005 sample covers a total of 9,655 establishments. For 9,587
of these establishments, Question 4a of the questionnaire provides owner-
ship information which allows us to identify establishments belonging to a
business group from those owned independently (see Table 1).
Category 11 (”other”) captures those establishments which do not have
a single largest shareholder, but two or more largest shareholders of differ-
ent type among the categories 1 through 10. Firms belonging to category
4 or 5, and those establishments in category 11 having either a domestic or
a foreign company among their largest shareholders, will be considered a
”subsidiary” in the following. This is the case for 1,102 establishments, or
about 11% of the total sample.
Next, we want to find out whether there are any business transactions
running along these ownership ties. Survey Question 9 allows us to shed
light on the identity of the main customers on the domestic market with
whom the establishments in our sample have trade relationships (Table 2).
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Table 2 - Q9 - What percentage (from 0 to 100) of your domestic sales are to:
Mean Std. dev.
1 Government or government agencies 4.26 14.35
(excluding state-owned enterprises)
2 State owned or controlled enterprises 6.93 18.05
3 Multinationals located in your country 3.93 13.72
(not including your parent company, if applicable)
4 Your firm’s parent company or affiliated subsidiaries 2.81 13.54
5 Large private domestic firms (those with approx. 250+ workers) 13.51 24.64
(not including your parent company, if applicable)
6 Small firms and individuals 65.96 38.26
7 Other 2.60 13.88
The distribution of sales shares is very skewed for all categories of Q9:
for Category 6 (small firms and individuals) the median response is 85%,
while for all other categories the median response is zero. This suggests
that the establishments in our sample fall into two broad categories: a large
group which mainly (or exclusively) deals with small firms and individuals,
and a small group of establishments which mainly deal with large entities
of the private or public sector. The focus of this paper will clearly be on the
latter category.
Question 9 is crucial for our purpose, because it allows us to identify
those establishments which have a supply relationship with their parent
firm, and to measure the strength of this tie in terms of the share of such
intra-group sales in the respondent’s overall sales. If an establishment has
positive sales to its own parent or affiliated subsidiaries (i.e. the establish-
ment reported at least 1% under category 4 of Q9), then I will call this estab-
lishment a ”vertically integrated (VI) firm”. These are establishments which
operate along the same vertical chain as their owner (or one of their owners,
if there are more than one); more precisely, they act as suppliers (i.e. are lo-
cated upstream) to their parent or affiliated subsidiary, i.e. we are looking at
cases of so-called “backward vertical integration” (as opposed to forward VI,
where the supplier holds a stake in its customer/retailer). This is the case
for 660 establishments, or 7% of the total 9,327 establishments who supplied
information on Q9.
The counterparts to these VI firms are identified as those establishments
that, according to Q9 of the survey, act as suppliers to other large firms,
but - unlike the VI firms - are independent from their customers in terms of
ownership. I will define a firm as ”vertically separated (VS)” if it is inde-
pendently owned (i.e. not a ”subsidiary” in the sense of Question Q4a), it
reports zero sales under category 4 of Q9, and at least 1% of its (domestic)
sales are to either multinationals or large private domestic firms (categories
3 and 5 in Question 9). The threshold level of 1% was chosen to mirror the
corresponding 1% threshold of intra-group sales for the VI firms, allowing
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us to create the largest possible pool of VS firms to confront our VI firms
with. There are 2,686 establishments satisfying these criteria, accounting for
29% of the full sample of 9,327 establishments who answered Q9.
Note that while all VS firms are non-subsidiaries by definition, the VI
establishments may or may not be “subsidiaries”, and vice versa: Out of a
total of 1,102 subsidiaries in our sample, as many as 890 (81%) do not sup-
ply their parent (they may either buy from their parent or have no sales
relationship with this parent at all); and 505 out of the 660 firms reporting
intra-group sales (77%) are not categorized as subsidiaries, implying that
the parent they sell to is just one of their owners, but not the largest share-
holder.
In other words, the vast majority of our VI firms display only partial
vertical ownership. While this paper is the first to document this phe-
nomenon for transition economies, it has been studied in some detail for the
US economy.8 In their study on corporate block ownership in the US, Allen
and Phillips (2000) construct a sample of 402 ownership stakes established
during the 1980 to 1991 period, covering all partial acquisitions by non-
financial corporations that exceeded a minimum of five percent of outstand-
ing shares; the mean fraction acquired was 20 percent of voting shares, with
a median of merely 14 percent. 37 percent of target firms in their sample
reported explicit product market relationships with their corporate block-
holder (i.e. buyer/supplier agreements, marketing/distribution arrange-
ments, technology sharing, joint R&D projects, or other service agreements
related to their primary business activities.)
Boone (2003) studies a sample of 220 US equity carve-outs of wholly
owned subsidiaries that occurred over the period 1985-1996. She finds that
following the IPO, the level of parental ownership retention varies from zero
percent (no ownership) to 95% of the subsidiary’s equity, although almost
three-fourths of the parent firms retained at least 50% of the subsidiary’s eq-
uity, implying that as many acquirers obtained a stake of less than 50% in the
same subsidiary. Moreover, 35% of the parents chose to retain partial own-
ership stakes in their subsidiaries for the full four-year examination period
over which Boone tracks these carve-outs, while some parents completely
divested their holdings later, and others chose to reacquire all of the equity
in the subsidiary so that it was once again wholly owned.
Kang (1993) investigates the performance of Japanese cross-border ac-
quisitions of US firms over the period 1975 - 1988. Restricting the sample to
those transactions for which stock price data are available on a daily basis,
he obtains a sample of 119 Japanese bidders and 102 US targets. Out of the
119 Japanese bidders, 30 cases were mergers and tender offers, 30 cases were
8 A textbook example of partial vertical integration is the U.S. cable TV industry, where
several operators acquired partial ownership stakes in cable or television networks (see
Waterman and Weiss 1997, O’Brien 2000, and Goolsbee 2007); Foros et al. (2011) investi-
gate a similar case in the Scandinavian cable TV market.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/175 13
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - Winter- Spring 2016, Article 1
Table 3 - Defining criteria for vertically integrated vs. separated firms
Integrated Separated
Subsidiary (Q4a - cat. 4 or 5) yes or no always no
Sales to own parent (Q9 - cat. 4) always yes always no
Sales to multinationals (Q9 - cat. 3) yes or no always yes
Sales to large private domestic firms (Q9 - cat. 5) yes or no always yes
partial acquisitions, and the remaining 59 cases were acquisitions of units.
From the point of view of the US targets, 21 cases were mergers and tender
offers, 26 cases were partial sales of independent firms, and the remaining
55 cases were divestitures.
A similar picture also emerges, at least for foreign investment (both fi-
nancial and industrial), in many other economies worldwide: Fons-Rosen
et al. (2013) study a large panel of 134,000 firms from 12 developed and 13
emerging countries, over the period 1999–2008, and track their foreign own-
ership shares for this period: In developed countries, 30 percent of all firms
with non-zero foreign ownership had less than 20 percent foreign owner-
ship, and another 15 percent had ownership shares between 20 and 60 per-
cent. These figures are significantly lower in emerging market economies,
where only 17 percent of partially foreign owned firms have a stake of less
than 20 percent, and 15 percent have a stake of somewhere between 20 and
60 percent.
Unfortunately, there is no question in the BEEPS about supplier details
corresponding to Q9, so that it is not possible to identify the ”downstream”
analogues to our VI and VS firms, i.e. those establishments who buy from
their parent (or from some major domestic or foreign firm they are indepen-
dent from in terms of ownership). Likewise, for those establishments whose
sales are not confined to the domestic market, i.e. who export part or all of
their output, we do not have any customer information analogous to that of
Q9. However, some 57% of all VI establishments do not export at all, and
only 13% have more than half of their sales on the export market. Among
the non-VI firms, a staggering 75% does not have any exports, and less than
8% have more than half of their sales on the export market. Thus, concen-
trating our analysis on those establishments which only serve the domestic
market does not seem too restrictive.
Table 3 summarizes the defining criteria for vertically integrated and
separated firms. To summarize, our final sample now includes 3,346 estab-
lishments, all of which have at least 1% of their sales with large firms on the
domestic market. Out of these 3,346 ”upstream” establishments, 660 estab-
lishments (or 20%) are vertically integrated with their main customer, while
the remaining 2,686 (or 80%) are vertically separated. Among the vertically
integrated suppliers, 74 establishments (or 11%) have a domestic parent, 70
establishments (or 10%) have a foreign parent, 11 establishments have either
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Table 4 - Q11 Customer reactions following a unilateral price increase of 10%
Our customers would continue to buy from us:
(i) in the same quantities as now 1
(ii) but at slightly lower quantities 2
(iii) but at much lower quantities 3
Many of our customers would buy from our competitors instead 4
a domestic or a foreign company among their largest shareholders, and the
remaining 505 establishments (or 77%) have a parent firm who is not among
the largest shareholders (and hence not classified as subsidiary).
4.2 The explanatory variable
The key explanatory variable proposed by TCE is the lack of supplier
substitution (see Joskow 2005, Klein 2005). The BEEPS data set offers a good
measure for the presence of lock-in through Question 11, which asks: ”If
you were to raise your prices of your main product line or main line of ser-
vices 10% above their current level in the domestic market (after allowing
for any inflation) which of the following would best describe the result as-
suming that your competitors maintained their current prices?” (see Table
4)
Some readers may find this question reminiscent of a SSNIP test (“Small
but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price”), a standard tool in an-
titrust policy to determine a firm’s relevant geographic and product market:
The application of the SSNIP test involves interviewing consumers regard-
ing buying decisions and determining whether a hypothetical monopolist
or cartel could profit from a price increase of 5% for at least one year (as-
suming that ”the terms of sale of all other products are held constant”). If a
sufficient number of buyers are likely to switch to alternative products and
the lost sales would make such price increase unprofitable, then the hypo-
thetical market should not be considered a relevant market for the basis of
litigation or regulation.
In a very similar spirit, Question 11 asks establishments about the likely
reaction of their customers to a 10% price increase not matched by any of
their competitors. If supplier substitution is possible, then the answer to
Q11 should be 4 (“Many of our customers would buy from our competi-
tors instead”), and so the customers of this particular establishment cannot
be considered as locked in to their current supplier, i.e. “lock-in” is non-
existent. If the answer is instead 1, 2, or 3, then supplier substitution is
either impossible (answer 1 to Q11) or at least difficult (levels 2 and 3).
Note that this multi-level measure of supplier substitution is of course
not a cardinal measure: The interval between any pair of categories (e.g.
between low and medium lock-in) cannot be assumed to be of the same
magnitude as the interval between any other pair (e.g. between medium
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and high lock-in). We will therefore map the responses to Q11 into four
dummies, which correspond to either no lock-in (Q11 = 4), low (Q11 = 3),
medium (Q11 = 2), or high lock-in (Q11 = 1).
Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of responses to Question 11 for the two
groups of firms that we are interested in, the VI and VS firms. To begin with,
note that each of the four categories receives a fair amount of responses (at
least 18 percent of the total population), i.e. there are no strong disparities
in the frequencies across categories. In particular, medium and even high
levels of lock-in seem to be quite common, with more than 50 percent of
establishments among both VI and VS firms reporting one of the top levels
of lock-in.
Second, note that VI firms (black bars in Figure 1) are less likely than VS
firms to report no or low lock-in (19 percent of the VI firms against 26 per-
cent of the VS firms report no lock-in, and 18 percent of VI firms report low
lock-in, as opposed to 20 percent of the VS firms); instead, VI firms are more
likely than VS firms to report medium and high levels of lock-in (37 percent
of VI firms report medium lock-in and 25 report high lock-in, as opposed
to 31 and 21 percent of VS firms, respectively). As the χ2 statistic reported
in Table 5B shows, the distribution of responses for VI firms is significantly
different from that for VS firms, suggesting that our raw data already lend
some support to the link between lock-in and corporate structure as pro-
posed by TCE.
Figure 1 - of lock-in for integrated and separated firms
One may wonder if this is an artefact of the way we defined vertical
separation: If our defining criteria for VS firms happened to apply only
to firms that have a much lower propensity to report medium and high
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lock-in than the average firm in our sample, our analysis would suffer from
selection bias. To convince the reader that this is not the case, let us compare
the distribution of lock-in among VS firms in our sample with that of the
firms that were excluded from the sample because they neither qualify as
VI nor as VS firms.
Figure 2 shows that if anything, VS firms are somewhat more likely to
report low and medium levels of lock-in, while they are less likely to report
either no or a high level of lock-in. In other words, the distribution of lock-
in levels is somewhat more compressed at the center for VS firms, and more
dispersed for those firms excluded from the sample. The Pearson χ2 statistic
is 14.7463, which means that the two distributions are different at the 1%
level.
However, we see that VS firms do not systematically report lower levels
of lock-in than the excluded firms. We will further investigate the question
of a possible selection bias in our section on the regression results, where
we will present robustness checks using the full sample including all firms
that participated in the BEEPS, to compare against the baseline regressions
which were performed on the reduced sample including only VI and VS
firms.
Figure 2 - Level of Lock-in for VS firms and firms excluded from the sample
Some readers may wonder whether the survey question regarding sup-
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plier price increases is at all meaningful in the context of a vertically inte-
grated structure, i.e. whether vertically integrated customers still have to
pay a price for the supplies they receive from an affiliated supplier, so that
we can interpret the answers to Q11 given by the vertically integrated re-
spondents in the same way as we do for the non-integrated counterparts.
It turns out that such prices, called “transfer prices” in the international
trade literature, continue to exist even after a supplier vertically integrated
with its buyer. When such intra-group transactions are cross-border, there
are two main reasons why a business group may want to distort its transfer
prices: Either to shift profits from high-tax countries to low-tax countries,
or to channel exports though third countries that have lower tariffs with re-
spect to the final destination country than the original source country (see
for instance Bernard et al, 2006). Such considerations clearly play no role
if the intra-group transactions are domestic (as is the case for the establish-
ments in this paper), so that there is no reason why a business group may
want to distort its domestic transfer prices; rather, these prices have im-
portant signalling and incentive functions, e.g. when it comes to deciding
what share of the supplier’s productive capacities to allocate to internal cus-
tomers, and which part to dedicate to external customers.
Of course, our data on lock-in as reported by the firms is far from being a
perfect measure of supplier substitution: To begin with, our lock-in variable
is survey-based: The suppliers were asked to report what they believed to
be the likely reaction of their customers to a hypothetical price increase of
10 percent, something they may never actually have tried out; second, the
question explicitly refers to the main product line or line of services, which
may or may not be the one sold to the parent or its subsidiary; and finally,
we cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality: Once a customer
is vertically integrated with its supplier, they may engage in relationship-
specific investments as a result of which lock-in may increase over the years.
To address these concerns at least partially, we will run a robustness
check using an alternative proxy for supplier substitution, namely the num-
ber of competitors the respondent faces for their main product line or ser-
vice in the national market (Question 12ba). Our results using the number
of competitors as explanatory variable strongly confirm the ones we ob-
tain using the lock-in variables derived from Question 11 instead. This is
reassuring, since the number of competitors is arguably a straightforward
question about a hard fact that does not require any guessing on the part of
the respondents.
Another set or robustness checks restricts the sample of VI firms to in-
clude only dedicated suppliers, i.e. firms who have 70 or even 80 percent of
their sales with their own parent; clearly, for these firms, the “main product
line or line of services” must coincide with the one they sell to their parent.
Again, we find that our results obtained from the larger sample are con-
firmed for this restricted sample, so that we should not be too concerned
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Table 5A - Descriptive Statistics for (near) continuous variables
VI firms VS firms T-test for
Mean Std. dev. # obs. Mean Std. dev. # obs. mean diff.
Log sales 7.24 1.902 449 6.53 1.733 2,037 t = 7.7776***
Age (in yrs.) 18.24 21.198 660 15.26 17.882 2,682 t = 3.6891***
Export share 14.98 25.469 660 11.12 22.371 2,686 t = 3.8576***
about Question 11 missing out on the product that is actually sold to the
parent.
Finally, to mitigate the problem of reverse causality, the regressions will
only include binary indicators of lock-in (rather than the original categorical
variable of Q11), and I also run a series of robustness checks on that variable,
where I consider different mappings of the ordinal lock-in variable into one
or two binary indicators; to the extent that reverse causality needs time to
operate, it should be less of a problem when looking at very young firms; it
is therefore reassuring that we still find a very strong and significant effect
of lock-in on vertical integration even among firms of less than four years
of age, i.e. among startups.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
We can now compare the two groups of establishments - vertically in-
tegrated and separated - with respect to standard firm characteristics like
size, age, mode of establishment, and industry. Table 5A reports descrip-
tive statistics for all (near) continuous variables of interest, while Table 5B
reports summary statistics for the categorical variables:
The first row of Table 5A shows the distribution of annual sales for both
vertically integrated and separated firms. The BEEPS Survey does not re-
port exact sales figures, but assigns each establishment to one of 13 sales
bins (see Figure 3 in the Appendix for the relevant upper bounds for each
bin9). We see that the sales distribution of the vertically integrated firms
(black bars) is clearly to the right of that for the separated firms (grey bars):
integrated firms tend to be larger than separated ones. Mean sales for the
VI firms are about 6.3m USD, while VS firms have about 3.2m USD, i.e. half
of the VI sales on average. The t-test on the means of log sales for both cat-
egories confirms that VI firms tend to have significantly higher sales than
their non-integrated counterparts.
Regarding establishment age, we see that integrated firms tend to be
somewhat older than separated firms. Figure 4 (see Appendix) shows the
distribution of foundation years for both categories of firms; the graph was
truncated from the left at 1970, but the year of establishment is available
9 The numbers reported in the figures sometimes rely on a smaller sample because of miss-
ing values in an indicator of interest; the underlying sample size for each group is indi-
cated in the legend of each figure (in brackets).
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Table 5B - Descriptive Statistics for categorical variables
Variable Categories VI firms VS firms Pearson χ2 Test
% response % response
Lock-in None 19.09 26.93 χ2 = 22.7034***
Low 18.33 20.16
Medium 37.27 31.56
High 25.30 21.35
# of full-time employees 2 - 49 49.70 67.30 χ2 = 72.0849***
50 - 249 32.27 21.86
≥ 250 18.03 10.84
Mode of establishment Privatization 23.00 14.09 χ2 = 52.1028***
Orig. private 68.65 81.83
Private sub. 2.90 1.26
JV with foreign 3.75 1.96
Other 1.70 0.86
Industry Mining 2.42 1.04 χ2 = 36.5250***
Construction 10.00 11.73
Manufacturing 50.61 44.64
Transport, Comm. 7.27 6.85
Wholesale, retail 15.91 21.74
Real estate 6.67 9.01
Hotels 4.24 2.01
Other 2.27 2.49
Diversified 0.61 0.48
for all establishments, including those founded before 1970 (accounting for
less than 12% of our sample). We see that there was a real boom in the
creation of new establishments starting in 1990, the year which marks an
important structural break for all transition economies; in our sample, more
than three-quarters of all establishments (2,566 out of 3,342) were founded
from 1990 onwards, with an almost even distribution across the years 1990
to 2001.10 Note that in the regressions, we will use firm age at the time of
the survey (i.e. the difference between foundation year and 2001) rather
than foundation year itself as control variable.
As for the share of exports in the firm’s total sales, we see that integrated
firms tend to export more than separated firms, namely about 15 percent
against 11 percent for the separated ones. However, in both groups, the
distribution of export shares is very skewed: the median firm reports zero
exports, while the top 10 percent among the exporters ship more than half
of their output abroad (see Figure 5 for a histogram of export shares of both
integrated and separated firms).
Let us now turn to the categorical variables. Table 5B reports the per-
centage of the responses by category and firm type (i.e. VI vs VS), as well as
a Pearson χ2 Test for each variable. We see that VI firms differ significantly
from VS firms in the distribution of responses for each of the following vari-
ables.
10 Recall that firms established after 2001 were excluded from the BEEPS sample.
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The first part of Table 5B shows the distribution of degree of lock-in
among vertically integrated and separated firms (see also Figure 1 above).
We see that vertically integrated firms are more likely to report medium
and high levels of lock-in, while separated firms are more likely to report
low levels of lock-in.
The size pattern we found before when comparing log sales is confirmed
if we measure establishment size by the number of full-time employees in-
stead (see also Figure 6). This variable only encompasses three size cat-
egories (small, medium, large), but it is a useful complement to the sales
variable, because it is available for all establishments, while only 75 per-
cent of our sample also reported sales figures. We see that two thirds of the
separated firms have less than 50 full-time employees, while only half of
the integrated firms fall into this category. The pattern is reversed for large
establishments: 18% of the vertically integrated firms have more than 250
full-time employees, while only 10% of the vertically separated firms reach
this size. We will use this categorical variable, rather than log sales, as firm
size control in our regressions, because log sales might be endogenous to
the dependent variable, because the latter is constructed from sales data as
well (intra-group sales are of course part of the firm’s overall sales).
As for the way in which the company was established, Table 5B illus-
trates that vertically separated firms are more likely to be established as
originally private firms, while vertically integrated firms are more frequently
created through privatization, as private subsidiaries of formerly state-own-
ed firms, or as joint ventures with foreign partners (see also Figure 7).
As for the sector composition of our sample, an establishment is assigned
to a particular sector if it reports more than 50% of its sales in this sector. If
an establishment does not have more than 50% of its sales in any single sec-
tor, it is assigned to the category ”diversified” (17 establishments, or 0.5%,
of our full sample). Figure 8 shows that vertically separated firms are some-
what overrepresented in construction and wholesale/retail trade, while in-
tegrated firms are relatively more frequent in manufacturing and mining; in
the remaining sectors (transport, real estate, and hotels & restaurants), the
shares are very similar.
Regarding establishment location, Figure 9 demonstrates that vertical
separation is particularly dominant in Kazakhstan, Romania, Hungary, Ukra-
ine, and Poland, while vertical integration is more frequent in Azerbaijan,
Slovenia, Bosnia, Turkey, and Serbia.
Finally, for those 660 establishments who report positive intra-group
sales, Figure 10 shows the CDF of intra-group sales for three sub-samples,
namely for those firms that reported either low, medium, or high lock-in. We
see that for each level of lock-in, the share of intra-group sales varies widely
among the VI firms. In line with Atalay et al. (2014), I find that only a small
portion of vertically integrated firms can be categorized as dedicated sup-
pliers of their parent firm: About 70 percent of these establishments report
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to sell less than 50 percent of their total production to their parent; and only
15 percent of these establishments ship more than 90 percent of their output
to their parent. We see that the CDF for high lock-in first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the one for low lock-in, while there is no clear relationship
between the CDFs for medium and high lock-in.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Regressions
Let us start by analyzing vertical integration at the extensive margin,
i.e. whether or not a firm has sales transactions with its own parent. This
dummy variable takes the value 0 if no such sales are reported, and value 1
whenever a strictly positive level of intra-group sales is carried out. We will
later compare the results at the extensive margin with those at the intensive
margin.
Table 6 shows the results of four different probit specifications, estimat-
ing the impact of each of the three levels of lock-in that a firm may report,
on the probability of an establishment having sales to its parent. The four
possible answers to question Q11 where transformed into dummies as fol-
lows: 1 = “lock-in high”, 2 = “lock-in medium”, 3 = “lock-in low”. Those
firms who reported level 4 in Q11 are classified as exhibiting no lock-in, i.e.
they are assigned value zero in all three lock-in dummies.
The four specifications differ by the set of covariates included in the re-
gression: Probit 1 only includes the three levels of lock-in, Probit 2 controls
for the establishment’s export share in total sales, its size and age, as well as
its mode of establishment, while Probit 3 adds industry and country dum-
mies; finally, Probit 4 replaces the industry and country dummies of Probit
3 with the full set of industry country interactions. (Numbers in brackets
next to a covariate’s name indicate the total number of categories available
for this categorical variable.)
We see that the dummies for medium and high levels of lock-in are pos-
itive and highly significant in all specifications. The regression coefficients
reported in Table 6 (and in all following probits) are always marginal effects;
we can thus read the results in Probit 4 as saying that, keeping all other
relevant firm characteristics at their mean level, a firm which goes from no
lock-in to medium lock-in is about 5 percent more likely to be vertically in-
tegrated, and going from no lock-in to high lock-in raises the probability of
vertical integration by almost 6 percent. Performing a χ2 test on the differ-
ence between the two coefficients, medium and high lock-in, we obtain a χ2
statistic of 0.17, so that we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality at any
meaningful significance level.11
11 The χ2 test on the difference between medium and high lock-in is not significant at the 5%
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Table 6 - The determinants of vertical integration - Baseline regressions
Dependent variable: Firm is VI (extensive margin)
Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4
Lock-in low .0396* .0332 .0150 .0124
(.02292) (.02325) (.02245) (.02416)
Lock-in medium .0829*** .0655*** .0426** .0484**
(.02012) (.02055) (.02026) (.02213)
Lock-in high .0856*** .0795*** .0520** .0590**
(.02293) (.02388) (.02368) (.02631)
Export share .0007** .0007** .0006*
(.00030) (.00031) (.00035)
Firm age -.0004 -.0004 -.0006
(.00053) (.00054) (.00057)
Firm size (3) No Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) No Yes Yes Yes
Industry (8) No No Yes No
Country (26) No No Yes No
Ind. x Country (208) No No No Yes
# of obs. 3,334 3,027 3,027 2,739
Pseudo-R2 0.0070 0.0359 0.0924 0.1148
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
Thus, so far our results are perfectly in line with the predictions of TCE
theory: lock-in is a major determinant for vertical integration.
5.2 Robustness Checks
Let us now perform a series of robustness checks to understand whether
our results are sensitive to the estimation procedure or to our variable defi-
nitions.
Table 7 shows the first set of robustness checks on various aspects of
the estimation procedure underlying Table 6. Probit 5 repeats Probit 4, but
imposing robust standard errors; Probit 6 clusters standard errors at the
industry-country unit. The second and third column of Table 7 show the
coefficients and marginal effects, respectively, when running a logit model
instead of the probit model, but using the same set of covariates as in Probit
4. And finally, we fit a linear probability model to our data (OLS1). We see
that medium and high lock-in remain highly significant across the different
statistical models.
As a next step, let us focus on the definition of our dependent variable:
Recall that any firm reporting a positive level of sales to its own parent is
categorized as vertically integrated, no matter how small the firm’s intra-
level for any specification except Probit 1 (the one which does not include any controls).
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Table 7 - The determinants of vertical integration. Robustness Checks I: Estimation
Procedure
Dependent variable: Firm is VI (extensive margin)
Probit 5 Probit 6 Logit 1 Logit 1’ OLS 1
(robust SEs) (clustered SEs) (robust SEs) marg. eff. (robust SEs)
Lock-in low .0124 .0124 .091 .2085 .008
(.02333) (.02544) (.1583) (.0202)
Lock-in medium .0484** .0484** .323** .3257 .039**
(.02142) (.02257) (.1401) (.0185)
Lock-in high .0590** .0590* .382** .2034 .048**
(.02571) (.03454) (.1590) (.0215)
Export share .0006* .0006 .004* 12.18 .001
(.00035) (.00043) (.0024) (.0004)
Firm age -.0006 -.0006 -.004 14.02 -.001
(.00057) (.00072) (.0038) ( .0006)
Constant — — Yes — Yes
Firm size (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. x Country (208) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 2,739 2,739 2,739 3,027
Pseudo-R2/ R2 0.1148 0.1148 0.1137 0.1506
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
group sales are relative to its total sales. This is of course the most “gener-
ous” definition we can give of a vertically integrated firm, and will generate
the largest possible number of such firms in our sample.
Table 8 proposes several alternative definitions of vertical integration,
which differ by the threshold on intra-group sales (as percentage of total
sales) that a firm has to reach to qualify as vertically integrated. Probits 7 to
10 repeat Probit 4 for a 20, 30, 70 and 80 percent threshold on the dependent
variable.
Clearly, at 70 or 80 percent, we can speak of “dedicated suppliers” to
their parents, and the results we find for these high thresholds complement
our results from Probit 4 in an interesting way. We see that medium lock-in
is no longer significant for the more dedicated suppliers, while high lock-
in remains highly significant; the magnitude of the marginal effect of high
lock-in remains fairly stable as well, at a level of somewhere between 4 and
6 percent.
Finally, we will explore our sample selection criteria along two dimen-
sions: First, to be even more demanding in finding vertical integration, we
require that a vertically integrated firm have not only positive sales to its
parent, but that this parent must be the firm’s largest shareholder, i.e. it
must also qualify as a “subsidiary” in the sense that it has a largest share-
holder in categories 4 or 5 of Question Q4a: This reduces our subsample of
vertically integrated firms from 660 to a mere 155; under this very restric-
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Table 8 - The determinants of vertical integration. Robustness Checks II: The depen-
dent variable
VI - extensive margin subsidiaries entire startups
≥ 20% ≥ 30% ≥ 70% ≥ 80% only sample only
Probit 7 Probit 8 Probit 9 Probit 10 Probit 11 Probit 12 Probit 13
Lock-in low .0302 .0285 .0049 .0116 .0149 .0149* .4256*
(.02330) (.02137) (.01841) (.01836) (.01361) (.00920) (.24368)
Lock-in medium .0383* .0294 .0276* .0197 .0082 .0263*** .5602***
(.02071) (.01886) (.01757) (.01650) (.01111) (.00818) (.18774)
Lock-in high .0598** .0430** .0446** .0401** .0230* .0297*** .5100**
(.02556) (.02339) (.02429) (.02356) (.01541) (.00987) (.20041)
Export share .0008*** .0004 -.00003 .0001 .0004 .0004*** .0019
(.00030) (.00028) (.00027) (.00025) (.00015) (.00012) (.00271)
Firm age -.0009* -.0005 -.0002 -.0002 -.0154 -.0001 —
(.00054) (.00047) (.00040) (.00037) (.02267) (.00019)
Firm size (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. x Country (208) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes some
# of obs. 2,416 2,276 1,622 1,506 2,232 7,285 117
Pseudo-R2 0.1312 0.1351 0.1523 0.1657 0.1772 0.1168 0.2192
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
tive definition of vertical integration, almost all covariates lose significance,
except for high lock-in, which remains significant, though only at 10 percent
(see Probit 11).
Second, let us be less restrictive in constructing the control group for our
VI firms: Rather than requiring that to qualify as VS, a firm must be inde-
pendently owned, and must have sales with large domestic companies or
multinationals, let us treat all firms in the sample that do not report intra-
group sales as vertically separated. Probit 12 reports the results of this exer-
cise: Our sample size more than doubles if we drop our restrictions on the
VS firms, and as a result, we can estimate our coefficients much more pre-
cisely. It is therefore not surprising that medium and high lock-in are now
even more significant than they were before; but most importantly, we see
that our results are not driven by selection bias, i.e. by our defining criteria
for the firms which are complementary to the VI firms: Even though the dis-
tribution of lock-in across VS firms differs from that of the firms excluded
from the sample (see Figure 2), the impact of lock-in on vertical integration
remains strongly positive even if we extend our sample to include also those
firms which do not qualify as VS firms.
Finally, Probit 13 studies the same question for a very small sub-sample,
namely firms which are at most 3 years old (startups). We see that even
in this very small sub-sample (117 firms), the impact of lock-in on vertical
integration is highly significant, and the marginal effect increases by a factor
of about 10.
In Table 9, we explore in more detail the role of our main explanatory
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Table 9 - The determinants of vertical integration. Robustness Checks III: The ex-
planatory variable
Lock-in dichot. Lock-in at 3 levels # comp.
Probit 14 Probit 15 Probit 16 Probit 17 Probit 18 Probit 19
Lock-in (dummy) .0379** .0443*** — — — —
(.01740) (.01580)
Lock-in low — — .0337* .0424** .0123 —
(.01913) (.01864) (.02416)
Lock-in high — — .0579** .0526** .0499** —
(.02629) (.02290) (.01927)
Nr. of competitors — — — — — -.0540**
(.02134)
Export share .0006* .0006* .0006* .0006* .0006* .0010**
(.00035) (.00035) (.00035) (.00035) (.00035) (.00040)
Firm age -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0010
(.00057) (.00057) (.00057) (.00057) (.00057) (.00068)
Firm size (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. x Country (208) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739 1,800
Pseudo-R2/ R2 0.1135 0.1147 0.1139 0.1147 0.1148 0.1225
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
variable, i.e. the level of lock-in. Recall that firms could report four different
levels of lock-in, from non-existent to high, and that our baseline specifica-
tion therefore included three dummies which correspond to three out of the
four possible categories, namely low, medium, and high lock-in. Let us now
redefine lock-in as a dichotomous variable: In Probit 14, lock-in takes value
1 if the firm reports any positive level of lock-in (low, medium, or high); in
Probit 15, lock-in is defined in a more restrictive way, taking value 1 only if
the firm reported at least a medium level of lock-in, while those reporting
low lock-in are assigned value zero.
Next, we also consider the possibility of redefining lock-in at 3 levels
rather than 4, so that lock-in can be either non-existent, low or high. To do
this, we have to lump two categories of the original data into one single level
of the new variable: Probit 16 shows results when low and medium lock-
in are reclassified as “low”; Probit 17 shows the case where firms reporting
no or low lock-in are pooled into the “no lock-in” category; and Probit 18
shows results for the case where the medium and high level reports are both
classified as “high”. This exercise again confirms that it is the medium and
high lock-in levels that drive vertical integration.
Finally, in Probit 19 of Table 9, we replace our measure of lock-in (Q11)
with a different measure of supplier substitutability, namely the number of
competitors in the national market the establishment currently faces for its
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main product line or service (Question Q12ba).12 Firms could respond to
this question by either “none” (value 1), “1 to 3” (value 2), or “4 or more”
(value 3). As we can see, the number of competitors has a strong negative
impact on the level of vertical integration. This is again in line with our
hypothesis that lack of supplier substitution (i.e. lack of competition on the
seller side of the market) is associated with higher levels of vertical integra-
tion.
5.3 Further Results on Lock-in and Vertical Integration
In this section, we will explore the impact of various important firm char-
acteristics on the role of lock-in at the extensive margin, and we will study
the impact of lock-in at the intensive margin of vertical integration.
Table 10 reports regression results when interacting the three lock-in
variables one by one with four specific firm characteristics: “young” refers
to a firm founded from 1990 onwards, “exporters” indicates a firm that has
positive exports, “large” refers to a firm having at least 250 employees, and
“Non manuf.” indicates a firm operating in any sector other than manufac-
turing. This approach allows us to purge the coefficients on lock-in from
possible confounding factors stemming from our specific sample composi-
tion: The firms in our sample are heterogenous with respect to a number of
characteristics, in particular their age, size, exporting status, and industry.
The focus on “young” firms is motivated by the important structural
break that the year 1989 represents for all transition economies; exporters
are singled out because they may be affiliates to a foreign multinational,
and therefore not report any intra-group sales under Q9 although they are
in fact vertically integrated (recall that Q9 only accounts for domestic sales,
not exports, to parents or their subsidiaries); large firms may react differ-
ently to the risks of hold-up than small firms because they tend to have
more bargaining power in any bilateral exchange; and finally, the available
evidence on the TCE theory typically focuses on firms in the manufacturing
sector, while our dataset is one of the few that allows us to verify the outside
validity of these findings towards other sectors in the economy.
Probit 20 shows that the interaction terms for young firms are not sig-
nificant, indicating that there is no differential impact of lock-in on vertical
integration for young firms as opposed for older firms (in particular, firms
founded before the fall of the Iron Curtain). Being an exporter significantly
reduces the impact of lock-in for very high levels of the latter (Probit 21).
Being a large firm raises the probability of being vertically integrated signif-
icantly in itself, but does not alter the impact of lock-in on the probability
of carrying out intra-group sales (Probit 22). Instead, operating in a non-
manufacturing industry significantly reduces the probability of vertical in-
12 See also Caves and Bradburd (1988) and Ohanian (1994) in using small-numbers bargain-
ing as a proxy for lock-in
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Table 10 - The determinants of vertical integration: The role of lock-in for different
subgroups of firms
Dependent variable: Firm is VI (extensive margin)
Young Exporters Large Non manuf.
Probit 20 Probit 21 Probit 22 Probit 23
Lock-in low .0278 .0372 .0214 .0080
(.05458) (.03250) (.0261) (.03346)
Lock-in medium .1039** .0458* .0529** .0817***
(.04936) (.02835) (.02367) (.03123)
Lock-in high .1067** .1083*** .0728*** .1115***
(.05875) (.03528) (.02815) (.03874)
IT1) .0222 .0433 .1920*** -.9430***
(.04288) (.03798) (.07181) (.09597)
Lock-in low*IT -.0188 -.0548 -.0665 .0098
(.05543) (.03882) (.05366) (.04860)
Lock-in medium*IT -.0618 .0023 -.0407 -.0612
(.0444) (.04198) (.05296) (.03499)
Lock-in high*IT -.0499 -.0942** -.1012* -.0842**
(.04807) (.03119) ( .04404) (.0597)
Export share Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. x Country (208) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739
Pseudo-R2/ R2 0.1157 0.1181 0.1159 0.1174
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
1) “IT” stands for “young” in Probit 18, “exporters” in Probit 19, etc.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
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Table 11 - The determinants of vertical integration - the intensive margin.
Dependent variable: Intra-group sales as % of total sales (0 - 100)
OLS 2 OLS 3 Poisson 1 Ordered Ordered
(true values) (winsorized) (10 bins) Probit 1 (10) Probit 2 (100)
Lock-in low 1.131 .9165 .1687** .0755 .0796
(1.1542) (.86426) (.06650) (.08594) (.08584)
Lock-in medium 1.456 1.223 .2399*** .1750** .1707**
(1.0368) (.77984) (.05992) (.07671) (.07667)
Lock-in high 2.415** 1.831** .3128*** .2234** .2245***
(1.1774) (.89895) (.06685) .(08635) .08627
Export share .019 .0194 .0023** .0024* .0024*
(.0185) (.0165) (.00095) (.00126) (.00126)
Firm age -.035 -.0325 -.0024 -.0022 -.0020
( .0313) (.02868) (.00150) (.00210) (.00209)
Firm size (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mode of establ. (5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. x Country (208) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 3,027 3,027 3,027 3,027 3,027
Pseudo-R2/ R2 0.1483 0.1487 0.1920 0.0890 0.0764
*/**/*** means significant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Reported probit coefficients are marginal effects.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
tegration, and also reduces the impact of high lock-in on the probability of
having positive sales with a parent (Probit 23).13
Finally, let us study the impact of lock-in on vertical integration at the in-
tensive margin, i.e. on the share of intra-group sales in a firm’s overall sales.
To this end, we use the continuous measure of intra-group sales as given by
the responses to question Q9d, rather than the dichotomous variables used
so far.
Table 11 shows results for different statistical models, using the same
covariates as in our baseline regression Probit 4, but now studying their
impact on the intensive margin of vertical integration. OLS 2 shows results
for an OLS regression on the values for intra-group sales as reported by the
firms. To make sure results are not driven by outliers, we repeat regression
OLS 2 on the winsorized data for intra-group sales, i.e. replacing the lowest
and highest values for intra-group sales by the value corresponding to the
5th and 95th percentile, respectively. We see that this reduces the level of
13 See Section 2 regarding the industry-specific evidence we have on TCE (automobile
components (Monteverde and Teece (1982)), aerospace industry (Masten (1984)), elec-
tricity generation (Joskow, 1985, Saussier, 2000), aluminum (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart,
1988), forestry (Globerman and Schwindt, 1986), chemicals (Lieberman, 1991), engineer-
ing (Lyons, 1995), trucking (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003, Baker and Hubbard, 2003,
2004), offshore oil gathering (Hallwood, 1991), information technology (Ulset, 1996), elec-
tronic components (Weiss and Kurland, 1997), construction (Gonza´lez-Diaz, Arrun˜ada,
and Ferna´ndez, 2000), and even stock exchanges (Bindseil, 1997)) None of these studies
allows us to confront the importance of lock-in for vertical integration across industries,
as we do here.
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the coefficient somewhat, but high lock-in remains highly significant even
under the winsorized dependent variable.
OLS may be considered an inappropriate statistical model for our depen-
dent variable, which runs in integers from 0 to 100, and has positive mass
on zero, on the multiples of 10, i.e. 10, 20, 30 etc, and on focal levels such as
15, 25 and 75. We therefore apply two specifications which are more appro-
priate for count variables, namely the Poisson model and an ordered probit.
The Poisson model is run on a 10-level scale constructed from the original
data by assigning all values from 0 to 10 to bin 1, from 11 to 20 to bin 2 etc.,
while the ordered probit is carried out both for the 10 step scale and for the
original 100-step scale given by the true data. We see that both in Poisson 1
and in the two ordered probits, the presence of either medium or high lock-
in raises the level of intra-group sales significantly. This shows that lock-in
not only affects the decision of whether or not to have intra-group sales at
all, but also on how much of your productive capacity to dedicate to the
parent firm.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to tap a new dataset, the BEEPS 2005
Survey carried out by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the World Bank, for the empirical analysis of TCE theory. Based
on some 3,300 establishments located in 27 Eastern European and Central
Asian countries, I test the key prediction of TCE theory, namely that more
lock-in should make vertical integration more likely.
This prediction is very clearly borne out in the data: At the extensive
margin, a firm whose customers are locked-in at medium or high levels is
about 5 to 6 percent more likely to be vertically integrated with its customer
than a firm whose customers are not locked-in. At the intensive margin, I
find that high lock-in raises intra-group sales by about 2 percentage points.
This results deepens our understanding of the driving forces behind cor-
porate structures along several lines: First of all, this paper documents a
number of stylized facts for vertical relations transition economies that have
only been studied for highly developed economies so far, such as the wide
dispersion of intra-group sales among vertically integrated structures, with
dedicated suppliers (having more than, say, 70 percent of their sales to their
parent) being a small minority among the vertically integrated firms (see
Atalay et al, 2014). Most importantly, however, this is the first paper to test
the predictions of TCE in the context of transition economies.
Historically, interest in the policy implications of TCE has been strongest
in the area of antitrust and regulation.14 Recall that the neoclassical view of
14 See Bell (2010), and Macher and Richman (2008) for an overview of the literature ap-
plying TCE to public policy issues; Williamson’s (1976) work on cable TV services in
California
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vertical restraints in general, and vertical integration in particular, i.e. any
governance structure that deviates from spot markets, was that of a mecha-
nisms for the enhancement and exploitation of market power. From a public
policy point of view, the main interest in TCE is therefore to allow antitrust
authorities to distinguish between contractual provisions most likely used
to enhance market power (which is illegal) and those most likely used to
promote economic efficiency (which is not illegal, can be used as a defense
in an antitrust case, and in general should be encouraged).
With the introduction of the so called “economic approach” into compe-
tition policy in many jurisdictions (including the European Union, to which
many CEE countries now belong), this exercise has become crucial in the
substantive analysis of vertical mergers, which run through the same ap-
proval process as any other merger.15 Weighing the potential pro and anti-
competitive effects of vertical integration is a particularly delicate exercise in
an environment like the CEE countries where state-guided contract enforce-
ment is often under-provided, so that alternative governance mechanisms
such as long-run supply contracts, which heavily rely on an efficient judi-
cial system, may be less feasible than they are in other parts of the European
Union.
My results indicate that in CEE, the lack of supplier substitutability still
is a major driving force behind vertical integration, even if we control for
each country’s particular legal environment (i.e. controlling for country
fixed effects); antitrust authorities should therefore carefully examine the
potential implications of any given vertical merger on the competitiveness
of the industry in which it arises, rather than relying on the presumption
that such mergers arise naturally out of a need to compensate for the insuf-
ficient legal infrastructure in the CEE countries.
15 See also Mullin and Mullin (1997) for an interesting application of this approach to the
ex-post evaluation of the famous antitrust case of United States Steel’s acquisition of the
Great Northern Ore Properties.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/175 31
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - Winter- Spring 2016, Article 1
References
Allen, J. W., Phillips, G. M., 2000. Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic
Alliances, and Product Market Relationships. Journal of Finance 55, 2791–
2815.
Anderson, E., Schmittlein, D. C., 1984. Integration of the Sales Force: An
Empirical Examination. Rand Journal of Economics 15, 385–395.
Atalay, E., Hortac¸su A., Syverson, C., 2014. Vertical Integration and Input
Flows. American Economic Review 104, 1120–1148.
Baker, G. P., Hubbard T. N., 2003. Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Own-
ership, Job Design, and Information. American Economic Review, 93(3),
551–572.
Baker, G. P., Hubbard T. N., 2004. Contractibility And Asset Ownership: On-
board Computers And Governance In U.S. Trucking. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 119, 1443–1479.
Bell, C. R., 2010. Transaction Cost Economics. In: Free, R. C. (Ed.), 21st Cen-
tury Economics: A Reference Handbook, vol. 1. Sage Publications, Los An-
geles, pp. 193–202.
Bernard, A. B. , Jensen J. B., Schott P. K., 2006. Transfer Pricing by U.S.-Based
Multinational Firms. NBER Working Paper No. 12493.
Bigelow, L., 2001. Efficient Alignment and Survival in the U.S. Automobile
Industry. Working Paper, Olin School of Business, Washington University,
St. Louis.
Bindseil, U., 1997. Vertical Integration in the Long Run: The Provision of
Physical Assets to the London and New York Stock Exchanges. Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153, 641–56.
Blanchard, O., 1993. Reform in Eastern Europe. MIT press, Boston.
Boone, A., 2003. The Interaction of Ownership, Governance, and Product
Markets: Evidence from Equity Carve-outs. mimeo.
Braconier, H., Ekholm, K., 2001. Foreign Direct Investment in Central and
Eastern Europe: Employment Effects in the EU. CEPR Discussion Paper
No. 3052.
Brenton, P., di Mauro, F., Lu¨cke, M., 1999. An Empirical Analysis of Foreign
Investment in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe. Empirica 26, 95–
121.
Copyright c© 2016 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 32
Giardino-Karlinger: Lock-In, Vertical Integration, and Intra-group Sales
Brouthers, K. .D, Brouthers, L. E., Werner, S., 2001. R&D mode choices in
Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Business Research 52, 83–91.
Carlin, W., Mayer, C., Sinn H.-W., Grilli, V., 1992. Restructuring Enterprises
in Eastern Europe. Economic Policy 7, 311–352.
Caves, R. E., Bradburd, R. E., 1988. The Empirical Determinants of Vertical
Integration. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9, 265–279.
Chiappori, P. A., Salanie´, B., 2002. Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of
Some Recent Work. CESifo Working Paper No. 738.
Choi, J. P., Ghosh A., Niu, S., Morita, H., 2014. Vertical learning alliances
and partial equity ownership in the presence of performance spillovers.
mimeo.
Coase, R. H., 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica, New Series 4, 386–
405.
Crocker, K. J., Reynolds, K. J., 1993. The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts:
An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement. Rand Journal of
Economics 24, 126–146.
Cuyvers, L., Dumont, M., Rayp, G., Stevens, K., 2005. Home Employment
Effects of EU Firms’ Activities in Central and Eastern European Countries.
Open Economies Review 16, 153–174.
Delios, A.,Henisz, W. J., 2000. Japanese Firms’ Investment Strategies in
Emerging Economies. The Academy of Management Journal 43, 305–323.
Dries, L., Germenji E., Noev, N., Swinnen, J. F.M., 2009. Farmers, Vertical
Coordination, and the Restructuring of Dairy Supply Chains in Central
and Eastern Europe. World Development 37, 1742–1758.
Dries, L., Swinnen, J. F.M., 2004. Foreign Direct Investment, Vertical Integra-
tion, and Local Suppliers: Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector. World
Development 32, 1525–1544.
Flath, D., 1989. Vertical integration by means of shareholding interlocks. In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization 7, 369–380.
Fons-Rosen, C., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sørensen, B. E., Villegas-Sanchez, C.,
Volosovych, V., 2013. Quantifying Productivity Gains from Foreign Invest-
ment. mimeo.
Forbes, S. J., Lederman, M., 2009. Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the
Airline Industry. American Economic Review 99, 1831–1849.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/175 33
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - Winter- Spring 2016, Article 1
Foros, Ø., Kind, H. J., Shaffer, G., 2011. Mergers and partial ownership. Eu-
ropean Economic Review 55, 916–926.
Globerman, S., Schwindt, R., 1986. The Organization of Vertically Related
Transactions in the Canadian Forest Products Industries. Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization 7, 199–212.
Gonc¸alves, R., 2013. Backward partial vertical integration with discrimina-
tory pricing. mimeo.
Gonza´lez-Diaz, M., Arrun˜ada, B., Ferna´ndez A., 2000. Causes of Subcon-
tracting: Evidence from Panel Data on Construction Firms. Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization 42, 167–187.
Goolsbee, A., 2007. Vertical Integration and the Market for
Broadcast and Cable Television Programming. Report com-
missioned by the Federal Communications Commission,
https,//apps.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A10.pdf.
Gow, H. R., Swinnen, J. F. M. , 1998. Up- and downstream restructuring,
foreign direct investment, and hold-up problems in agricultural transition.
European Review of Agricultural Economics 25, 331–350.
Greenlee, P., Raskovich, A., 2006. Partial vertical ownership. European Eco-
nomic Review 50, 1017–1041.
Grossman, S. J., Hart, O. D., 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 691–719.
Hallwood, P. C., 1991. On Choosing Organizational Arrangements: The Ex-
ample of Offshore Oil Gathering. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 38,
227–241.
Harrigan, K. R., 1986. Matching Vertical Integration Strategies to Competi-
tive Conditions. Strategic Management Journal 7, 535–555.
Hennart, J.-F., 1988. Upstream Vertical Integration in the Aluminum and Tin
Industries. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9, 281–299.
Hoekman, B., Djankov, S., 1996. Intra-Industry Trade, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, and the Reorientation of Eastern European Exports. World Bank Pol-
icy Research working paper No. 1652.
Hubbard, T. N., 1999. How Wide is the Scope of Hold-Up Based Theories of
Governance? Shipper–Carrier Relations in Trucking.Working Paper, De-
partment of Economics, UCLA.
Copyright c© 2016 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 34
Giardino-Karlinger: Lock-In, Vertical Integration, and Intra-group Sales
Joskow, P. L., 1985. Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case
of Coal-Burning Electric Generation Plants. Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 1, 33–80.
Joskow, P. L., 2005. Vertical Integration. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M. M. (Eds.),
Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer US, pp. 319–348.
Jovanovic, D., Wey, C., 2013. Passive Partial Ownership, Sneaky Takeovers,
and Merger Control. mimeo.
Jude, C., Pop Silaghi, M. I., 2016. Employment effects of foreign direct in-
vestment: New evidence from Central and Eastern European countries.
International Economics 145, 32–49.
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., Schankerman, M., 2000. Measuring
Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats
Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies. World Bank Pol-
icy Research Working Paper 2312, April 2000.
Kang, J.-.K, 1993. The international market for corporate control: Mergers
and acquisitions of U.S. firms by Japanese firms. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 34, 345–371.
Klein, P. G., 2005. The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Stud-
ies. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M. M., (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional
Economics, Springer US, p. 435–464.
Lafontaine, F., Shaw, K., 1999. The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evi-
dence from Panel Data. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1041–1080.
Levy, D., 1985. The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An
Empirical Examination. Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 438–445.
Levy, N., Spiegel, Y., Gilo, D., 2015. Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership
Structure and Foreclosure. mimeo.
Lieberman, M. B., 1991. Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical
Test. Journal of Industrial Economics 39, 451–466.
Lyons, B. R., 1995. Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-
or-Buy Decision: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 26, 431–443.
Macher, J. T., Richman, B. D., 2008. Transaction Cost Economics: An Assess-
ment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences. Business and Politics
10(1).
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/175 35
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - Winter- Spring 2016, Article 1
MacMillan, I. C., Hambrick, D. C. , Pennings, J. M., 1986. Uncertainty Re-
duction and the Threat of Supplier Retaliation: Two Views of the Backward
Integration Decision. Organization Studies 7, 263–278.
Masten, S. E., 1984. The Organization of Production: Evidence from the
Aerospace Industry. Journal of Law and Economics 27, 403–417.
Masten, S. E., Meehan, J. W., Snyder, E. A., 1991. The Costs of Organization.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7, 1–25.
Masters, J. K., Miles, G., 2002. Predicting the Use of External Labor Arrange-
ments: A Test of the Transaction Cost Perspective. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal 45, 431–42.
McMillan, J., Woodruff, C., 1999. Interfirm Relationships And Informal
Credit In Vietnam. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1285–1320.
Monteverde, K., Teece, D. J., 1982. Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical
Integration in the Automobile Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 206–
213.
Mullin, J. C., Mullin, W. R., 1997. United States Steel’s acquisition of the
Great Northern Ore properties: Vertical foreclosure or efficient contractual
governance? Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13, 74–100.
Nickerson, J. A., Silverman, B. S., 2003. Why Aren’t All Truck Drivers
Owner-Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in In-
terstate For-Hire Trucking. Journal of Economics and Management Strat-
egy 12, 91–118.
Ohanian, N. K., 1994. Vertical Integration in the U.S. Pulp and Paper Indus-
try, 1900–1940. Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 202–207.
Pavlı´nek, P., 2004. Regional Development Implications of Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Central Europe. European Urban and Regional Studies 11, 47–
70.
Pirrong, S. C., 1993. Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A
Transactions Cost Explanation. Journal of Law and Economics 36, 937–976.
Salop, S. C., O’Brien, D. P., 2000. Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership,
Financial Interest and Corporate Control. Antitrust Law Journal 67, 559–
614.
Saussier, S., 2000. Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The
Case of Electricite´ de France. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 42, 189–206.
Copyright c© 2016 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 36
Giardino-Karlinger: Lock-In, Vertical Integration, and Intra-group Sales
Serbera, J. P., 2011. Partial horizontal and vertical ownership. Applied Eco-
nomics Letters 18, 531–537.
Spiller, P., 1985. On Vertical Mergers. Journal of Law, Economics and Orga-
nization 1, 285–312.
Stuckey, J., 1983. Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum
Industry. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Swinnen, J. F. M., 2002. Transition and Integration in Europe: Implications
for agricultural and food markets, policy, and trade agreements. The World
Economy 25, 481–501.
Tirole, J., 1991. Privatization in Eastern Europe, Incentives and the Eco-
nomics of Transition. In: Blanchard, O. J., Fischer, S. (Eds.), NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 1991, vol. 6. MIT Press, Boston, pp. 221–268.
Uhlenbruck, K., De Castro, J. O., 2000. Foreign Acquisitions in Central
and Eastern Europe: Outcomes of Privatization in Transitional Economies.
Academy of Management Journal 43, 381–402.
Uhlenbruck, K., Meyer, K. E., Hitt, M. A., 2003. Organizational Transforma-
tion in Transition Economies: Resource-based and Organizational Learn-
ing Perspectives. Journal of Management Studies 40, 257–282.
Ulset, S., 1996. R&D Outsourcing and Contractual Governance: An Empiri-
cal Study of Commercial R&DProjects. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 30, 63–82.
Walker, G., Weber, D., 1984. A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy
Decisions. Administrative Science Quarterly 29, 373–391.
Waterman, D., Weiss, A. A., 1997. Vertical Integration in Cable Television.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, and AEI Press, Washington, DC.
Weiss, A. M., Kurland, N., 1997. Holding Distribution Channel Relation-
ships Together: The Role of Transaction-Specific Assets and Length of Prior
Relationships. Organization Science 8, 612–623.
Whinston, M. D., 2003. On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical
Integration. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19, 1–23.
Williamson, O. E., 1975. Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust im-
plications: A study in the economics of internal organization. Free Press,
New York.
Williamson, O. E., 1976. Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In Gen-
eral and with Respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics 7, 73–104.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/175 37
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 7, Issue 1 - Winter- Spring 2016, Article 1
Williamson, O. E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting. Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O. E., 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, UK.
Copyright c© 2016 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 38
Giardino-Karlinger: Lock-In, Vertical Integration, and Intra-group Sales
7 Appendix - Figures
Figure 3 - Distribution of Annual Sales
Figure 4 - Distribution of Annual Sales
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Figure 5 - Histogram of export shares for VI and VS firms
Figure 6 - Number of full-time employees
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Figure 7 - How was the company established?
Figure 8 - Integrated and Separated Firms by Industry
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Figure 9 - Distribution of firms across countries
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Figure 10 - CDF of intra-group sales, by degree of lock-in
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